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INTRODUCTION 
THE GOVERNORSHIP of an American state during the Civil War was a difficult and frustrating position filled with respons­
ibilities, and furnishing few rewards either personally or political­
ly. The necessities of armed combat, the raising and care of troops, 
the mustering of men and money produced, almost inevitably, con­
fusion and adverse reactions. Few were the governors of American 
states who survived the war with reputations unimpaired. During 
the years of the great American conflict, there were sixty-three men 
who held office as governors of the Northern states. Only a handful 
were acclaimed later for having been "great War Governors." Oliver 
P. Morton in Indiana, John A. Andrew in Massachusetts, and Andrew 
G. Curtin in Pennsylvania receive such a popular accolade, but the 
great majority—James T. Lewis in Wisconsin, Stephen A. Miller in 
Minnesota, Samuel J. Kirkwood and William M. Stone in Iowa, for 
example—were lost from popular memory. Few governors were 
re-elected—and few were even renominated by their parties. The 
duties and obligations of the governorship—even when they were 
faithfully executed—brought little satisfaction to the public and less 
to the unfortunate men who managed the affairs of the states in time 
of turmoil. 
In a larger sense, the Civil War brought a subtle but substantial 
change in federal-state relations. The federal union, which Abraham 
Lincoln swore to uphold and for whose defense he first called upon 
the states for troops, was made up of "sovereign" states jealous of 
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their distinctive powers and rights. Under the exigencies of war— 
a war waged for a national purpose—the rights of the states became 
subordinate to the powers of the nation, and a "New Nation" emerged 
from the Civil War. In many instances the growing power of the 
national government and the weakening role of the states brought 
conflict between state and federal officers. Ohio's Civil War his­
tory, however, was marked by no serious clashes between her gov­
ernors and the national administration. Instead, there was a remark­
able harmony, and the constitutional transition was made easier be­
cause Ohio's governors could act as a mediating influence. With one 
accord, they co-operated with Lincoln and the Washington authorities. 
They were neither radicals trying to push the government to extreme 
positions, nor obstructionists attempting to preserve an old and un­
tenable independence. 
Three in number were the governors of Ohio, and none of them 
won or warranted the title of "great." They were, each in his own 
way, efficient and competent. Each was diligent, patriotic, devoted, 
and hardworking. Yet, none of them was popular, none was re-elected 
or renominated. Their very competence and diligence, of tremendous 
importance to the nation in its hour of extremity, cost them the re­
ward of public acclaim. Yet, of the sixty-three governors of Northern 
states, William Dennison, David Tod, and John Brough were among 
the more able, the more diligent, and the more dependable. 
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WILLIAM DENNISON 
THE BEGINNING of the Civil War found William Dennison occupying the governor's office in the capitol in Columbus. He 
had been elected in 1859; and although there were rumors of 
war and mounting sectional tensions, no one had really believed that 
war was imminent; and no one thought of selecting candidates for 
governor on the basis of their ability to manage state affairs in time 
of war. Instead, William Dennison owed his nomination by the Re­
publican party to his eminent availability and the absence of any con­
spicuous rivals for the honor. 
The two administrations of Salmon P. Chase, Ohio's first Repub­
lican governor, had served to establish the new Republican party in 
Ohio. It was a party made up of diverse elements: old Whigs who 
were committed to the ancient "American System" of Henry Clay, 
ardent abolitionists from the Western Reserve, rising industrialists 
from the burgeoning communities close to iron and coal deposits, 
and railroad promotors who envisioned systems of iron rails which 
could connect Ohio's rivers and lakes and carry its products even 
across the Alleghenies. There was a tinge of temperance in the party 
and more than a trace of soreheads who had been rejected by the 
more conservative elements which dominated the Democratic party. 
By 1857, too, there were Know-Nothings, who hated foreigners and 
feared the Roman Church, coming to rest in Republican ranks. In 
1855, Salmon P. Chase—who had been a Democrat and a Liberty 
party man, then a Free Soiler, and even a Democrat again, but who 
had always been an outspoken enemy of slavery—won the governor­
ship on the Republican ticket. Re-elected in 1857, Chase devoted his 
time to organizing the Republicans, ironing out the disagreements 
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in their ranks, and marshalling them into an effective political unit. 
There were, true enough, great personal rivalries among the leading 
Republicans, but the party was, essentially, the representative of reform 
and of progress. It appealed to business men and industrial laborers 
—new elements in Ohio society—rather than to the older agricultural 
and commercial interests.1 
By 1859, the Republicans had achieved political experience and 
sufficient cohesion to enable Chase to go to the United States Senate. 
His departure made way for William Dennison, a man who had been 
a Whig in politics and one of the original organizers, along with 
Chase, of the Republican party. He was a native of Cincinnati, a 
graduate of Miami University where he had excelled in history and 
belles lettres, and a lawyer who had practiced with conspicuous suc­
cess. He had been a banker, and was director and president of a 
railroad. He had served in the state senate where he had stood firmly 
against the state's Black Laws and had spoken against the Buchanan 
administration's efforts to extend slavery into the territories. He had 
opposed the annexation of Texas, the war with Mexico, and the 
Compromise of 1850. His interests were broad. He organized a 
county agricultural society, served on the Columbus city council, and 
helped establish an iron rolling mill in the capital. Though he was 
not as prominent as Chase, his antislavery record was clear, and he 
shared with his predecessor an impressive demeanor—even an air 
of pomposity—and very considerable ability. His nomination by the 
Republicans came, however, almost by default and not from any 
appreciation of his qualities. Most of Ohio's prominent Republicans 
were in Congress and Dennison was simply available. He won the 
nomination without significant opposition.2 
In 1859, Ohioans faced several economic problems that could have 
played a role in the gubernatorial campaign, but both political parties 
preferred instead to concentrate on national issues. Rather than at­
tempting to reconcile conflicting opinions within their parties on such 
questions as the disposal of the state canal system, an independent 
treasury, and taxation of state banks, both Republicans and Demo­
crats discussed the Fugitive Slave law and the federal courts. Demo­
crats also raised the issue of free Negroes in Ohio, asserting that any­
one with a "visible admixture" of African blood should not be allowed 
to vote. They condemned Republican-sponsored personal liberty laws 
that hindered enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act and demanded 
that state officers fulfill their constitutional obligations by remanding 
escaped slaves captured within Ohio's borders. Republicans, dropping 
their earlier emphasis on restricting slavery expansion, crusaded against 
OHIO'S CIVIL WAR GOVERNORS 
the Fugitive Slave law and demanded reforms in the federal court 
system that would give better representation to the various sections 
of the country. Radical Republicans also prevented the renomination 
of Chief Justice Joseph R. Swan to the State Supreme Court, because he 
had, in May, upheld the constitutionality of the disputed fugitive law. 
Although Joshua Giddings, abolitionist Congressman from the Western 
Reserve, exulted at his party's radical course, Abraham Lincoln, who 
would be Republican presidential nominee in I860, disapproved of the 
Ohio party's actions. He felt that such a struggle against the Con­
stitution would greatly endanger the Republican cause in the nation.3 
The Democrats selected Rufus P. Ranney, an able lawyer and former 
Supreme Court judge, to oppose Dennison and brought Stephen A. 
Douglas, the country's leading Democrat, into the state to speak for 
him; Republicans countered by importing Lincoln to stump for Den­
nison. Although the Republican gubernatorial candidate surprised 
fellow politicians with his success in debating Ranney during a stump 
tour across the state, Dennison later would prove more suited to 
issuing platitudes against slavery extension and Supreme Court deci­
sions than to rallying a state under the stress of war. Dennison won 
this political test and defeated his rival by 13,236 votes, about the 
average majority for Republican gubernatorial candidates. The Repub­
lican party also carried the rest of the state offices and won back con­
trol of both houses of the state assembly. This legislature, with Re­
publicans outnumbering Democrats 25 to 10 in the Senate and 58 to 
46 in the House, would be in session at the opening of the Civil War.4 
Unfortunately for Dennison, the majority of Ohioans gave him their 
votes but not their hearts. The suave, well-mannered gentleman 
seemed to most citizens to be a vain and haughty aristocrat. Among 
railroad men and bank officers, Dennison had a reputation for finan­
cial ability and a capacity for controlling large operations; but he 
never was able to reach outside his small circle of friends to gather 
the popular support he needed as governor. To the end of his life, 
only a few men knew Dennison well; most found him impersonal 
and austere. In the months ahead, when the governor sought to 
mobilize Ohio for war, he lacked the full support of the state; Ohio­
ans proved to be quick with criticism and slow with praise.5 
During the campaign debates, Dennison had spoken well; but after 
the returns were in, his speeches became prolix and stilted. His in­
augural address, delivered January 9, I860, was long and verbose. 
The new governor surveyed many subjects: he launched an attack on 
slavery, claimed the western territories for freedom, condemned seces­
sionist plots, and prophesied that the West would soon be in control 
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of the federal government. Though he promised Ohio would sup­
port the Constitution with all its compromises and would protect the 
rights and property of citizens of other states, he denied the Union 
was an instrument to propagate human slavery, and he criticized 
Supreme Court decisions which asserted the right of property in men. 
Dennison ended his address with a plea for colonization of free 
Negroes. Despite the wide sweep of Dennison's message, one of his 
unfortunate phrases attracted most of the publicity; he solemnly stated 
that if the South seceded, a standing army "would be the succedaneum 
for the security conferred by a common government." Henceforth he 
was known, even to important Republican newspapers, as the "suc­
cedaneum Governor."6 
In one of his first official actions as governor, Dennison had an 
opportunity to appear as the conciliator of sections when, late in 
January, the legislatures of Kentucky and Tennessee visited Ohio. 
The recently completed Louisville and Nashville railroad had just 
joined the capitals of the two states; and, when their respective legis­
latures met in Louisville to celebrate the event, Dennison invited them 
to cross the Ohio and come to Columbus. Dennison there capped a 
series of speeches proclaiming the common interests of the three states 
by promising that Ohio would recognize the right of people in every 
state to establish and maintain undisturbed their domestic institutions. 
The sovereignty of the states had to be maintained, he declared, in 
all matters not clearly designated to the federal government.7 
Despite such attempts to achieve harmony through oratory, actions 
proved more indicative of the future relations between the border 
states. The Kentucky legislature had no more returned home than 
it drew up and passed a law to reorganize and strengthen the state 
militia. In March, Dennison refused to consider the request of Ber­
iah Magoffin, Kentucky's governor, to return two men charged with 
helping to free a slave. A few days earlier, Dennison had denied a 
similar appeal from another neighboring governor, John Letcher of 
Virginia, who asked that Ohio return two members of John Brown's 
raiding party. In both cases Dennison based his refusal to extradite 
on the grounds that the offenses for which the fugitives were to 
answer did not rank among those listed in the Constitution. Ohio 
Democrats quickly made an issue of Dennison's failure to ease the 
distrust of neighboring slave states and later sought to embarrass him by 
trying to pass a bill compelling the governor to deliver fugitives on 
request—this attempt failed. Despite harassment from Democratic 
and conservative quarters, Dennison had quickly and clearly indicated 
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he would not go beyond oratory in any attempt to conciliate the south­
ern states.8 
Shortly after Dennison took office, the preliminaries of the I860 
presidential campaign began to reveal internal dissensions in both the 
Republican and Democratic parties. Among Ohio's Republicans, there 
were supporters of New York Senator William H. Seward, the newly 
elected Senator Chase, and Senator Ben Wade from the Western Re­
serve. At one time or another, the governor seemed to favor each 
of the aspirants. In April, he visited Washington, attended a dinner 
at Sewards, entered the floor of the Senate as Chase's guest, and 
laughed affably with Seward. By the time the Republican National 
Convention met in Chicago's Wigwam, Governor Dennison was on 
hand to tell reporters he preferred Seward if one of Ohio's senators 
could not be nominated; but cynical observers concluded that he fav­
ored Wade primarily because he hoped to be elevated to the Senate 
should Wade be translated to the White House. Ohio's delegation 
to Chicago was sharply divided, but at the last moment Chase's floor 
manager announced the change of four votes from Chase to Lincoln 
and thereby gave Illinois' favorite son the nomination. Dennison 
was content enough with the result, and returned to Ohio to work 
for the party's nominee. 
With the national Democratic party seriously divided, the Repub­
licans had little trouble carrying Ohio for Lincoln. In October, the 
state elections returned Republicans with greater majorities than in 
the previous year; and in November, even southern counties, which 
were conservative on slavery issues but which were attracted by the 
promises of a tariff to protect coal and iron, added to Lincoln's plural­
ity of 40,000 over Democrat Stephen A. Douglas.9 
During the secession winter" of 1860-61, Governor Dennison and 
the Ohio legislature faced the problems of a dividing nation and 
emerged with divided counsel. The governor watched carefully the 
rising tide of disunionism in neighboring Kentucky, and he carefully 
prepared his January message to the legislature with a view to streng­
thening unionist sentiment there. He favored, he said, the repeal 
of state personal liberty laws and the elimination of the "offensive 
and derogatory clauses"—the obnoxious features"—of the federal 
fugitive slave law. He thought that the "discontents" which had 
grown up between the sections ought to be reconciled, and he was 
willing that the Free States should take the first steps in making con­
ciliatory gestures. Although he felt obliged to defend his refusal to co­
operate with his neighbors in extraditing "criminals" to Kentucky 
and Virginia, the governor conveniently recalled the legislative visit 
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of the previous year and its rhetorical harmony. He was, he assured 
his listeners, strongly in favor of the Constitution and the abrogation 
of all laws contravening rights of their fellow citizens below the 
Ohio; he was willing to yield everything to the South that "may be 
consistent with right, justice, humanity and the demands of a Christ­
ian civilization." Then, having declared his willingness to go the 
second mile, he denounced secession, declared secessionists were trait­
ors, demanded enforcement of the laws, and added that Ohio would 
not allow hostile communities to cut off the Mississippi. He also 
asked the legislature to strengthen the state militia organization.10 
The legislature responded with equal confusion. In Washington, 
conciliators were working for compromise, and the legislature asked 
Congress to call a convention to amend the Constitution. Republicans 
in caucus agreed on a set of resolutions declaring that the people of 
Ohio opposed "meddling with the internal affairs of other states," 
and suggested that the states should repeal any legislation conflict­
ing with the Constitution or laws of the United States. They asserted 
also that the strength of the national government had to be maintained 
and pledged the entire power and resources of Ohio for that purpose. 
Democrats failed to amend the resolutions with disavowals of intent 
to coerce the South. The Senate also defeated a proposed effort to 
reconcile sectional differences by sending commissioners from the free 
states along the border to the nearby slave states.11 
When Virginia called a peace conference in Washington, Dennison 
consulted with fellow governors John Andrew, of Massachusetts, and 
Richard Yates, of Illinois, asking them if they were sending delegates. 
He urged Yates to refuse acceptance of the conference proposal at 
least until Lincoln was inaugurated. When the governor submitted 
the Virginia proposals to the Ohio legislature, he pronounced the 
terms of adjustment "inadmissable" and regretted that the Virginians 
had made no mention of reliance on an unaltered Constitution. After 
a lengthy debate between Republican radicals and conservatives, the 
legislature agreed to accept the invitation and, on January 30, auth­
orized Dennison to select commissioners for the conference. The 
governor appointed six Republicans and only one Democrat, but their 
opinions ranged from old-line Whiggery to abolitionism. In general, 
Buckeye radicals felt Dennison had appointed a conservative delega­
tion; Chase, one of the delegates, considered himself the only mem­
ber not prepared to go for compromise. Although Dennison later 
added another radical to the commission when one of its original 
members died in Washington, the Ohioans approved every section 
of the compromise resolutions. However, both houses of Congress 
10 
OHIO'S CIVIL WAR GOVERNORS 
rejected the proposals, and when they were submitted in the Ohio 
House, legislators tabled them.12 
While conciliation was in the air, President-elect Abraham Lincoln 
visited Ohio on his way to Washington. On his fifty-second birthday, 
the incoming chief executive stopped in Cincinnati and the next day 
made his way to Columbus. His remarks before the legislature 
and from the back of trains were as inconclusive as Dennison's 
pronouncements had been. Referring to the sectional crisis, Lin­
coln assured Ohioans that "it is a good thing that there is no 
more than anxiety, for there is nothing going wrong." Dennison 
and other prominent Republicans were disappointed at his remarks, 
which contained no hint of future policy.13 
The confusions of the winter were not resolved until Lincoln sent 
supplies to Fort Sumter and the Confederates opened fire upon the 
fort. In Ohio, the first weeks of the Lincoln administration were en­
livened by a contest in the legislature over the selection of a senator 
to take the place of Chase, whom Lincoln had taken into his cabinet. 
Dennison was an active and hopeful candidate; his supporters in 
the Republican caucus included many "irrepressibles" from the West­
ern Reserve who stood by him for seventy-eight ballots. However, 
many radical Republicans preferred John Sherman, and eventually 
they managed to get the caucus to name him. On March 21, a joint 
convention of the two houses elected Sherman to the Senate. Den­
nison's ambitions for a Senate seat did not abate; but when he did 
go to Washington, he went as a cabinet member not as Senator.14 
The following month, the intricacies of politics and the rivalries 
of politicians gave way momentarily to the new issues of raising 
armies and furnishing supplies for the war. Yet the wounds of 
political controversy were not healed, and Dennison was to suffer 
from them as he turned his attention to military affairs. On April 
15, three days after the firing on Fort Sumter, Lincoln called for 
75,000 militia to suppress "combinations too powerful to be 
suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings." Dennison 
immediately wired Washington to inquire about Ohio's quota under 
the call and to assure Lincoln that there was "great rejoicing here 
over your proclamation." On the same day, after learning from the 
Secretary of War how many troops were expected from him, Dennison 
issued a series of proclamations calling for thirteen regiments or 
10,153 men. He asked the people of Ohio to rise above all party 
bias in order to uphold free institutions, the Union, and the state 
of Ohio. The response was immediate and enthusiastic; mass meet­
ings resolved to support the Union cause, and David Tod, one of 
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the state's leading Democrats who within a year would hold Den­
nison's job, promised Lincoln that 200,000 Ohio Democrats would 
stand by him in crushing treason and rebellion.15 
The call for arms imposed new duties on the governor. As com­
mander-in-chief of the state militia, he had to perfect its organiza­
tion and get troops into the field as quickly as possible; he also had 
to guarantee the state full protection from any suspected invasion. 
His position as chief executive demanded that he recommend ap­
propriate measures to the legislature to prepare the state for war, 
provision its troops, and guarantee funds for purchasing arms and 
equipment. Finally, as state Republican leader, he had to conciliate 
differences within his party and gain its full support in marshalling 
Ohio's resources for the conflict. In accordance with his obligations, 
on April 16 Dennison asked the General Assembly for an appropria­
tion of $450,000 to purchase arms and equipment for the volunteer 
militia and requested prompt organization and arming of the state's 
military forces. The legislature, not without violent debate, promptly 
passed a bill appropriating one million dollars for the purpose of 
protecting the national government and arming the state militia. Fur­
ther legislation followed; and by the time the legislature adjourned 
on May 13, it had authorized the governor to accept new regiments 
to aid the federal government or to fend off invasion, forbidden the 
transportation of contraband through the state, provided for the re­
lief of militia families, passed a measure to define and punish treason 
against the state of Ohio, and had reorganized the militia, increased 
the governor's staff, and appointed additional general officers.16 
Despite prompt action on the part of the legislature, Dennison had 
to struggle through a mass of difficulties. Although his predecessor 
had made an effort to reform the militia, regimental organization 
existed only on paper. In late I860, Adjutant-General H. B. Carring­
ton had reported that he could not, under any emergency, collect more 
than 1200 men suitably equipped and prepared for duty. At that 
time, Carrington declared that the system Governor Chase had set 
up was useless without legislative appropriations; although some at­
tempts had been made to raise the needed money, on April 15, 1861, 
nothing had been accomplished. When Dennison discovered that 
the state had only a few boxes of smooth-bore muskets, some worn-
out six-pounders, and a pile of mildewed harness for armaments, he 
sent agents to Illinois, Massachusetts, and New York to purchase 
weapons. He also commissioned a Massachusetts agent sailing for 
England to buy Enfield rifles for Ohio and bombarded Secretary of 
War Simon Cameron with requests for ordnance.17 
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Dennison also had personnel problems; he had retained Chase's 
military staff, never dreaming at the beginning of his administration 
that these men might have anything important to do. The staff 
proved hardly prepared for its tasks. Some members had no executive 
ability, others no tact, and few commanded the confidence of Ohio's 
volunteer soldiers. As soon as he realized his mistake, Dennison 
undertook a reorganization of the staff and requested that Cameron 
send him a West Pointer to run his military establishment. The Sec­
retary curtly refused. Frantic for the assistance of someone with 
military ability, Dennison accepted the advice of a delegation from 
Cincinnati and appointed George B. MClellan major-general of the 
Ohio militia.18 
Despite Ohio's complete lack of preparedness, her quota of vol­
unteers was rapidly filled as enthusiasm for the war swept through 
the state. Several independent companies of volunteer infantry from 
Columbus, Cleveland, and other larger cities led the way, and soon Den­
nison was embarrassed with an excess of men. His adjutant-general, 
frantic before the swarm of volunteers pouring into the capital, ac­
cepted too many regiments. Dennison had to plead with Cameron 
to accept more than Ohio's quota. Instead of the thirteen regiments 
requested, Dennison was organizing twenty-two; he told Cameron 
he could not stop short of that number "without seriously repressing 
the ardor of the people." Cameron turned down the extra regiments, 
but the Ohio legislature came to Dennison's aid by authorizing him 
to take the additional troops into state service. Even then, Carring­
ton had to disband thirty volunteer companies and warn others not 
to come to Columbus.18 
Seeking to clarify his problems and to co-ordinate his activities with 
those of his neighbors, Dennison went to Cleveland early in May to 
meet with the governors of Indiana, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and 
Michigan; agents from Illinois and New York also attended. Den­
nison, who had called the meeting, welcomed his counterparts, and 
together they determined that the government in Washington needed 
their combined wisdom. The Ohio governor complained that Lincoln 
had neither plans for defending the Northern border states nor for 
prosecuting a vigorous war against the South. He wanted permission 
to march his troops into Kentucky and Virginia and hoped for orders 
from Washington to stop exports of provisions into the slave states. 
Impatiently, Dennison declared that the time for speaking had passed; 
he demanded an aggressive war. The governors agreed with Denni­
son's sentiments and sent messages to Lincoln pledging their support 
for every measure, no matter how extreme, to put down the rebellion. 
13 
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Now that Washington was safe, they demanded the President give 
more attention to the safety of the border free states. 
Lincoln responded immediately to the governor's attempt to formu­
late war policy. On the day after the Cleveland conference, he called 
for forty regiments of three-year volunteers, to be "subject to the 
laws and regulations governing the Army of the United States." The 
governors could still commission officers, but the President would 
direct and control the army. From now on Dennison would be so 
busy raising troops for Lincoln that he would have little time for 
further conferences.20 
Lincoln's request for troops found Dennison already in considerable 
difficulty trying to care for the regiments raised under the first militia 
call. In answer to Cameron's pleas, he sent two regiments to Wash­
ington without arms, uniforms, or equipment. Rail communications 
with the capital were disorganized and Ohio troops were delayed 
in Pennsylvania. Since the regiments had not had an opportunity to 
elect officers, Dennison sent a Democrat, George W. McCook, to 
Pennsylvania to lead the troops on to the capital. Republicans im­
mediately raged at the appointment, but their anger became even 
greater as they considered the situation of the militia regiments still 
in Ohio. The first companies to reach the state capital found no 
quarters prepared for them; Dennison's commissary general, George 
W Runyan, met this problem with an old solution—he lodged them 
in the city's hotels, which had patriotically lowered their rates to 
$1.25 a day. The troops also had to eat; Runyan contracted with a 
local restauranteur to feed the soldiers at fifty cents a day. Unfortun­
ately, the contractor's facilities were more adequate for serving ladies' 
auxiliaries than hundreds of hungry troops; soldiers soon complained 
that they had to wait three hours for breakfast. While militiamen 
sighed over cold flapjacks, state legislators screamed about excessive 
contracting costs and demanded Dennison remove incompetents on 
his staff.21 
The governor hurriedly took steps to avert further criticism by 
reorganizing his staff, appointing McClellan to take charge of the 
state volunteers, and establishing several military camps in Columbus 
and Cincinnati to handle the increasing numbers of troops. McClellan 
set up the largest of these posts outside Cincinnati, named it—un­
fortunately for the governor—Camp Dennison and ordered volunteers 
from Columbus for organization and training. On April 29, the first 
troops poured into Camp Dennison to be greeted by a heavy rain 
which turned the camp into a swamp. Since no cooks could be found, 
the men had to prepare their own food; a contractor provided water 
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which he drew from a well next to a slaughterhouse. Soon, disease 
struck down half the camp, while the other half lacked adequate 
housing, blankets, uniforms, and arms. Dennisons's agent in New 
York, pressed hard for provisions, sent back large quantities of the 
first supplies he could find; the men hoping for clothing, guns, and 
ammunition, found he had sent tent poles. The governor, anxious 
to have his constituents satisfied, allowed his agents to pay high prices 
for supplies. Outraged legislators demanded investigations and ac­
cused Dennison of favoritism in handing out provisioning contracts. 
Even Republican newspapers took up the cry against the governor; 
and McClellan, who had full responsibility for Camp Dennison and 
its disorders, said nothing.22 
In the midst of the chaos came Lincoln's May call for three-year 
volunteers. The war department gave the state executives the job of 
raising and organizing the new regiments; Cameron made no provi­
sion for transportation, pay, or subsistence for the regiments while 
they were forming and gave their officers no authority until their 
units were filled and mustered. Until the regiments were completed, 
the state government had to provide for the troops; this led to further 
complaints of lack of clothing and shelter. Upon pressure from 
Dennison, Cameron finally agreed to muster in the men in small 
squads so that the federal government could furnish them subsistence.23 
As Dennison set about raising recruits, he found Cameron had 
authorized men to enlist troops in Ohio independent of his own 
authority. When he learned Cameron had allowed W G. Sherwin 
to raise a regiment of artillery in the state, he hastily wrote the Sec­
retary, "For God's sake withdraw the authority. Such a commission 
will make a farce of the public service." He warned Cameron it 
would be impossible to pursue any system in organizing troops in 
Ohio if he authorized men to raise recruits outside the discretion and 
direction of the governor. Dennison became further irritated at news 
that General John C. Fremont had agents in Ohio to enlist troops 
in his command. The governor refused to dispatch troops to Fremont 
in Missouri until Lincoln ordered it done. The President also had to 
ask the governor to commission Fremont's regimental officers. Finally, 
at Dennison's continued urging, Cameron gave him complete control 
over all regiments being organized in the state. At this news, one 
of Fremont's agents complained to Lincoln that if the order were 
enforced, the government would lose several thousand men who 
"will not have anything to do with Governor Dennison.' General 
Don Carlos Buell thought Dennison interpreted his powers too broad­
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ly; he complained to McClellan, "The Governor evidently looks upon 
all Ohio troops as his army I shall stop all this sort of thing."24 
Dennison, undaunted by criticism, moved to implement his recruit­
ing powers and set up committees to supervise recruiting in each 
county and congressional district. These committees supplied speak­
ers, held public rallies, kept an eye on recruiting officers, and approved 
candidates for commissions in the new regiments. Dennison also 
instructed them to keep him advised of "the existence and influence 
of any secret organization of men opposed to the war." The governor 
worried about treasonable activities, and in a proclamation issued 
August 29, calling for recruits, he warned against any suggestions 
"for negotiation or compromise with armed rebellion." There would 
be no peace or adjustment, he declared, without the complete sur­
render of the rebels to the federal government.26 
Under the repeated calls issued before and after the Cleveland 
conference, Dennison could raise Ohio's quota both by re-enlisting 
the three-month militia for three years and by signing up new regi­
ments. Thus, on May 17, he called on the three-month volunteers to 
re-enlist, praising them for their endurances despite an admittedly 
"hurried, and necessarily imperfect organization of the army." The 
militia regiments gathered at Camp Dennison, where they were to 
reorganize. Unfortunately, the reorganization came only after con­
siderable difficulty. By state law, the three-month militia had elected 
their own officers; under the May 4 call, the governor was to appoint 
them. Many soldiers, dismayed by this invasion of their rights, re­
fused to re-enlist. They mingled in camp with the three-year volun­
teers, disrupting discipline and adding to the overcrowding and chaos. 
Although Dennison urged that the three-month men who refused to 
re-enlist be mustered out, the regimental commanders sent them home 
on furlough without discharge or pay. Between two and three thous­
and men thus spread over the state, angry and dissatisfied with both 
the army and the governor.26 
Dennison had complained that the federal government lacked initia­
tive; when Lincoln replied to this complaint with a call for volunteers, 
the Ohio governor faced difficulties financial as well as military. As 
he struggled to fill the state quotas and keep the troops supplied before 
the federal government took over the provisioning, he rapidly ex­
hausted funds appropriated by the legislature. Certainly some of the 
expenditures were questionable: the editor of the Lebanon Citizen 
wondered why obstetrical instruments were included in a $20,000 
appropriation for army surgical equipment, noting that "this is a 
highly pregnant fact!" However, much of the expense was unavoid­
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able as the federal government moved slowly in providing for troops 
mustered into its service, and disturbances at Camp Dennison delayed 
recruitment. When the federal government finally repaid Ohio for 
expenses accumulated in raising troops for the United States, the 
state auditor decided that such reimbursements could not be used 
again for military expenditure without another legislative appropria­
tion. Dennison, not willing to convene the General Assembly while 
his administration was facing strong criticism, sent his own agents 
to Washington, cut off the money before it reached the state treasury, 
and expended it to feed, clothe, and arm the state soldiery. In this 
manner the governor distributed over one million dollars refunded 
by the federal government. Although Dennison kept careful account 
of all money spent, the extra-legal means he used brought an additional 
storm of criticism.27 
At Cleveland, Dennison had not only called for a vigorous prosecu­
tion of the war, he also wanted the federal government to formulate 
a policy for defending the border free states. From the beginning 
of hostilities, the Ohio governor had worried about an invasion from 
below the Ohio River; in attempting to avert that possibility, he al­
ternately followed a policy of pacifying and coercing the Southern 
border. On May 13, he asked the General Assembly for an appro­
priation of $30,000 to aid Unionists in Missouri, but the legislature 
turned him down, and Dennison had to leave that problem to Governor 
Richard Yates, of Illinois. Kentucky was closer at hand, and required 
more immediate attention. Since the beginning of the year, Dennison 
had kept agents in his neighbor state to help strengthen the Union 
cause. In April, worried Cincinnatians requested 10,000 men to keep 
Kentucky from placing batteries on bluffs across the river; the in­
formants wanted the governor to garrison Cincinnati and protect her 
railroads from sabotage. Dennison quickly got permission from Cam­
eron to make the city a rendevous for troops and asked him to send 
heavy guns down from Pittsburg. However, on April 23, when a 
delegation from Louisville protested that Cincinnati "Home Guards" 
were seizing goods moving through the city to Kentucky, Dennison 
sent a letter to Cincinnati, stating that "so long as any state remains 
in the Union, with professions of attachment to it, we cannot dis­
criminate between that State and our own." At the moment, Dennison 
had an agent in Louisville, consulting with Governor Magoffin about 
maintaining Kentucky's neutrality, and he did not want to endanger 
the negotiations by any overt acts.28 
Although by April 23 Dennison's agent in Louisville had opened 
up a "friendly and frank communication" with Magoffin, the Ohio 
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governor preferred to believe reports of Kentucky's hostility rather 
than rumors of its friendliness. On April 25, Dennison faced a de­
cision on his Kentucky policy. He received a wire from Magoffin, 
asking if Dennison and Governor Oliver P. Morton, of Indiana, 
would co-operate with him in an effort to bring peace between the 
warring sections. Dennison consulted Morton, and the two governors 
agreed to hold a conference with Magoffin in Cincinnati. When the 
Kentucky governor, hesitant about entering Ohio, sent an agent, 
Colonel Thomas Crittenden, instead of attending personally, the two 
northern governors refused to meet him. Dennison wrote Crittenden 
that "believing the General Government to be wholly in the right, 
I can see no reason for the interposition suggested." He and Morton 
would negotiate only with Magoffin, and only for the purpose of 
uniting in a call for the seceded states to return to the Union. "Any 
other solution is impossible and a truce would only aggravate the im­
pending evils." Magoffin, on hearing of the governors' decision, 
left for Cincinnati, only to find that Dennison and Morton had hur­
ried away.29 
Now Dennison, determined to end further attempts to conciliate 
Kentucky, moved to keep contraband from crossing the Ohio. On 
April 29, he notified express and railroad companies not to carry any 
arms, munitions, or other contraband out of the state; he had already 
taken possession of telegraph lines in Ohio to prevent any dissemina­
tion of troop movements. Although the state legislature had auth­
orized him to appoint inspectors to stop shipments of arms and mu­
nitions going into the slave states, Dennison eventually decided to 
leave this delicate matter to the federal authorities.30 
When it appeared to Dennison that the Cleveland conference had 
not affected the federal government's border-state policy, he called a 
meeting with Governors Yates and Morton at Indianapolis. There, 
ignoring Magoffin's earlier compromise attempts, he spoke of Ken­
tucky's defiant attitude and urged that the federal government seize 
prominent points in the state—Louisville, Paducah, Covington, New­
port—and the railroads leading to them from the south. This move, 
he maintained, would save Kentucky for the Union, end the threat 
of invasion into the northern free states, and strengthen the loyalists 
in Tennessee. The governors agreed on Dennison's recommendations 
and stressed the importance of a campaign plan for the West. After 
signing a memorial to send to Washington, Dennison returned home. 
From now on he would let Morton worry about Kentucky; he wanted 
to attend to the Unionist cause in western Virginia.31 
The western counties of Virginia were already simmering with 
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discontent. On April 30, Secretary Chase in Washington urged Den­
nison to encourage a convention of Unionists by massing Ohio troops 
across the river from Wheeling, Virginia. Dennison had anticipated 
Chase. Already he had assured Virginia Unionists that Ohio would 
protect them if they broke off from secessionist Virginia. By May 
7, Unionists in Parkersburg, Virginia, were pleading with Dennison 
for troops to occupy the town; on the same day, the governor got 
McClellan's Department of the Ohio extended to include western 
Virginia. On the 10th, Dennison urged the general to take troops 
across the Ohio river to seize the western terminals of the Baltimore 
and Ohio railroad. McClellan refused, objecting that such a move 
would be very dangerous, "particularly in view of the condition of 
the troops and the administrative branches." On May 20, Dennison's 
agents informed him that rebel troops were on the way to Wheeling. 
The governor, beginning to doubt McClellan's willingness to act, 
hurried the news to Secretary of War Cameron. Four days later, 
Cameron asked McClellan to "counteract" the effect of rebel troop 
movements in order to save western Virginia for the Union. Mc­
Clellan, now ready to move, asked Dennison for Ohio militia—militia 
which, as it turned out, had not been mustered into federal service. 
Dennison willingly complied; and on May 26, McClellan invaded 
Virginia with soldiers in the pay of a state. He quickly secured the 
line of the Baltimore and Ohio and protected the Wheeling conven­
tion while it debated the future of western Virginia.32 
The federal government promised to adopt the Ohio troops used 
in western Virginia into United States service, muster them out on 
their return, and pay them. However, when the regiments did come 
home, they found no mustering officers, paymasters, muster-rolls, or 
money. The troops had to go home without pay, and 9,000 more 
discontented men were scattered about the state. The incident afford­
ed another example of a problem beyond Dennison's control; difficul­
ties which nevertheless told against him in his bid for renomination 
in 1861.33 
Ohio Republicans were anxiously anticipating the fall elections, 
and hoped to gain the support of prowar Democrats for a Union 
ticket. But in any such coalescing movement they would have to 
dump Dennison. Democrats could not be expected to vote for a man 
who had helped organize the Ohio Republican party, fought for re­
peal of the state's Black Laws, opposed the Fugitive Slave Act, and 
smothered compromise attempts. As convention time drew near, 
Democratic newspapers, led by Samuel Medary's Columbus Crisis and 
the Cincinnati Enquirer, effectively used Dennison's extra-legal dis­
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position of federal funds, his inept handling of provisioning con­
tracts, and the general disorder accompanying the raising of state 
troops to damn his administration. Still more significant opposition 
to Dennison's renomination came from within his own party. The 
"succedaneum governor" had never been popular with rank and file 
Republicans; and as they watched him grope for solutions to the 
many problems that pressed on him after the firing on Fort Sumter, 
they quickly decided he was better fitted for running a bank than a 
state. Republican as well as Democratic newspapers raised an outcry 
at his arbitrary interference with ordinary telegraphic dispatches, thus 
turning an important element against his candidacy. Leading men 
in both parties joined in condemning the confused situation at Camp 
Dennison and blamed Dennison, not the federal government, for the 
delay in mustering out and paying the first three-month volunteers. 
While Democrats cried that his military appointments were partisan, 
Republicans were horrified to find that Dennison had managed to 
get three Democrats, and only one Republican, named to the four 
generalships assigned to the state.34 
As early as June 13, Sam Medary commented that Dennison's 
friends had withdrawn his name from the list of candidates and that 
the Republicans would name someone suitable to prowar Democrats. 
On August 7, the regular Democrats held their convention, nominat­
ed H. J. Jewett for governor, criticized state and national administra­
tions, and recommended a national convention to settle difficulties 
and preserve the Union. The Republicans stalled while their coalition 
movement gathered strength, and then, on September 5, held a Union 
convention to nominate David Tod, an old Democratic wheelhorse, 
for governor. The delegates passed brief resolutions declaring the 
purpose of the war was solely to maintain the supremacy of the 
Constitution and the preservation of the Union without condition or 
compromise. They managed to avoid giving Dennison a vote of 
confidence. In the ensuing election, Tod won easily with a 55,203 
majority, and the Union party gained an overwhelming majority in 
both houses of the General Assembly.35 
On January 6, 1862, William Dennison delivered his last message 
to the state legislature; the address, even longer and wordier than 
usual, ranged over a wide variety of topics. He reviewed the growth 
of Ohio's resources, charted her financial condition, defended his 
unauthorized expenditure of federal money, and, as a state bank di­
rector, expressed extreme disapproval of Chase's national bank and 
currency schemes. Dennison made no mention of the new Union 
parry's policy, but avowed personal belief that the war would eventual­
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ly end slavery. However, still hoping that the Negroes could be 
colonized in Central America, he repeated his earlier reservations 
about immediate emancipation. 
Thus ended the term of Ohio's first war governor. Many misfor­
tunes during his administration stemmed from ineptitude, delay, and 
incompetence in the federal government's War Department; other 
mistakes arose from the inexperience of both governor and staff. Per­
haps Dennison's chief fault was a failure to reorganize his adminis­
tration immediately after Sumter. At any rate, by the end of 1861 
the governor had solved most of his problems and had ended loose 
spending and mismanagement. Despite early doubts of his executive 
capacity, no one could question his vigor in securing western Virginia 
for the Union and demanding speedy action in Kentucky. In the 
midst of innumerable difficulties, he had raised 23 regiments for three 
months and 82 regiments for three years, totalling slightly over 100,­
000 men, an excess of 20,000 over the calls made upon the state. Al­
though he had handled large sums of money without legal authority, 
Dennison had paid the state's debts, supplied her soldiers, and fur­
nished the state auditor with an account of every penny spent. He 
had streamlined his staff and created county and district military 
committees, all of which greatly eased the path of his successor. No 
Ohio chief executive had ever exercised such powers and fulfilled 
such duties with a greater sense of public responsibility and determina­
tion. Nevertheless, the exigencies of politics dictated his demise; 
Republicans could win in 1861 only with a less radical candidate who 
had no connection with the outgoing administration. So Dennison 
paid the price of leading the state into the first year of war. The 
newly-elected governor, Tod, recognized Dennison's capacities and 
used his services frequently during his own administration. In 1864, 
Abraham Lincoln, who was also quite aware of the former chief 
executive's abilities, made Dennison his postmaster-general. Indeed, 
it was only after his governorship was over that William Dennison 
gained the popular approval Ohioans had denied him while he was 
in office.37 
DAVID TOD 
In contrast to Dennison, whose parting message was prolix and 
involved, the new governor was sharp, almost curt, in his inaugural 
address. During the campaign in the summer of 1861, David Tod 
had refused to debate Democrat H. J. Jewett and had sought to create 
an impression that he was a direct, forceful administrator who would 
let his actions speak louder than his words. In his principal cam­
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paign speech he had taken a stark stand against compromise; and 
when he came to take his oath as governor, he was emphatic that 
the national government should be restored—and restored "irrespec­
tive of the influence this may have upon the domestic institutions of 
any of the states." However, in the same breath Tod assured South­
erners that the North sought only the maintenance of the Constitu­
tion, not the destruction of slavery. The war, said Tod in words 
that at once echoed Lincoln's first message to Congress and anticipated 
by a score of months the brilliant formulation of the Gettysburg 
Address, was a test of man's capacity for self-government. It was 
in Tod's mind, a stern admonition to the legislature to measure up 
to its responsibilities. He was impatient with the solons' slowness 
in passing measures for the welfare of the troops. He demanded 
immediately just and equal taxes. He wanted an austere reduction 
of salaries and expenses in the face of the demands of the war.38 
Governor Tod was blunt. His grim approach to his new duties 
and responsibilities seemed to mark a new man, utterly unlike the 
sociable, urbane, witty, and genial politician who had long been 
prominent in Democratic parleys. He had always given an appear­
ance of frankness and honesty, even of firmness, but a tactful ap­
proach had hitherto characterized him. His last position of promin­
ence before secession and civil war had been as chairman of the 
Baltimore Convention of the disrupted Democrats which had nominat­
ed Stephen A. Douglas. He was a Douglas man, but he tried man­
fully to heal the breach in his party. Conciliation, compromise, and 
genial tact had seemed to characterize him then and to be the es­
sential features of his personality. These were the qualities which 
had recommended Tod to the "Union" Republican convention which 
nominated him.39 
David Tod's political career, always as a faithful Democrat, had 
been long in Ohio politics. He was a native of Youngstown, a law­
yer who had made a fortune from the coal and iron resources of the 
Mahoning Valley. He was, in fact, the founder of the Youngstown 
iron industry. He had promoted, and then become president of, the 
Cleveland and Mahoning Railroad. In politics, he had represented 
the business interests with which he was associated. In the state senate 
he was known as a hard-money man, but he had trimmed his views 
on banking and monetary policy to suit whatever faction controlled 
the party. He had opposed the extremists—the "loco-focos" and the 
abolitionists like Salmon P. Chase who would make the Democratic 
party into an agency of social reform. With John Brough in the 
state assembly, he had promoted a fugitive slave bill. He had helped 
22 
OHIO'S CIVIL WAR GOVERNORS 
read Thomas Morris, an antislaveryite, out of the party. He had 
opposed the repeal of Ohio's black laws. Yet, under pressure, he 
had agreed Negroes should participate fully in the common school 
funds.40 
He was, withal, ambitious for political power. In 1844 and 1846, 
he had been an unsuccessful candidate for governor. From 1847 to 
1852, he had been minister to Brazil. In 1863, Samuel Medary, 
Copperhead editor of the Columbus Crisis, who had been Tod's close 
associate in prewar Democratic politics, recalled that Tod had promised 
him the Brazilian post if Medary would edit the state party's news­
paper during the 1846 gubernatorial campaign. Medary agreed; but 
when Tod lost the election, he took the ministerial position himself. 
Although Medary announced in January, 1862, that he would view 
Tod's administration "with leniency, if not with favor, especially as 
compared with the outgoing one," he soon began to criticize the 
new governor and his Union Democrat compatriots. Medary had 
never given his support to the war; Tod, who in early 1861 had 
warned Republicans not to coerce the South, after the firing on Sum­
ter had promised Lincoln his full assistance. Thus, Medary and Tod 
went their separate ways.41 
In his new role as a forceful, forthright, aggressive governor, David 
Tod faced his problems. Many were problems inherited from Den­
nison, and fortunately for him, frequently solutions had already been 
worked out under his predecessor. Tod inherited Dennison's staff, 
which now consisted of men of competence and experience, and he 
continued to use the former governor's military committees. By taking 
advantage of Dennison's experiences, Tod was able to avoid some 
of the mistakes which had proved disastrous to his predecessor.42 
But Tod's administration brought a host of new difficulties. The 
national government demanded more, ever more, new troops—taxing 
the capacity of the people and the ingenuity of the governor. Tod 
had troubles with Washington, troubles with his own people, troubles 
with his legislature, and he faced invasion and the threat of invasion 
of the state over which he presided. Neither his appearance of force­
fulness, nor the genial personality of a politician were to spare him 
from a fate not unlike Dennison's. 
Tod's accession to office coincided with Lincoln's appointment of 
bewhiskered Edwin M. Stanton to replace Cameron as Secretary of 
War. Stanton was another of Tod's prewar Democratic associates, 
and it appeared that relations between the Ohio chief executive and 
Washington would be cordial. Shortly after his inauguration, Tod 
sent a query to Stanton which indicated that, despite the experiences 
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of nine months of war, relationships between state and federal gov­
ernments regarding the raising and control of troop were still not 
clear. Tod wanted to know what were his duties in procuring sup­
plies, what control he had over state troops after they were sworn 
into federal service, whether the federal government would refund 
all money Ohio expended on her troops, and what control he as gov­
ernor had over military prisoners in the state. Fortunately, Tod's 
duties in raising soldiers during the first few months of his adminis­
tration were light; he merely filled regiments then in camp. On April 
3, Stanton actually discontinued recruiting, although in late May he 
had to appeal for temporary troops to defend Washington from 
Stonewall Jackson's forays in the Shenandoah valley. By the time 
Tod had raised 5,000 men at Camp Chase to send on to the national 
capital, the Confederate threat had subsided; but Stanton praised 
Tod's "stirring appeal" to Ohioans for aid in the crisis and urged that 
he continue to recruit three-year volunteers.43 
Tod's respite from the burdens of meeting troop calls was brief. 
In late June came McClellans defeat before Richmond, forcing Lin­
coln to ask for more troops. Fearing he might cause a panic by appeal­
ing publicly for volunteers, Lincoln proposed that the governors de­
mand a call for 150,000 men. The governors grudgingly agreed; 
Tod complained to Stanton that the five regiments he was currently 
organizing were "in the absence of disastrous news from Richmond, 
all that Ohio can readily raise." When Lincoln issued his call, he 
doubled the number he had induced the governors to request, yet 
he told them that "I should not want half of 300,000 new troops if 
I could have them now." The state executives soon reported that 
recruiting was slow; they demanded a bounty, and some suggested 
a draft. Lincoln was not long in answering; on August 4, under 
the authorization of a militia draft act passed by Congress, he called 
on the governors for 300,000 militia to serve for nine months and 
asked the governors to draft militia to fill any gaps in the earlier call 
for three-year volunteers. The governors were to begin drafting on 
August 15, a date that was rapidly approaching. Since Stanton let 
one three-year volunteer equal four nine-month militiamen, the gov­
ernors were able to meet the combined calls, but the draft and new 
levies nevertheless presented Tod and his harrassed fellow executives 
with heavy burdens.44 
Ohio's quota under the calls totalled about 74,000; Tod had al­
ready ordered an enrollment of the militia preparatory to any eventual 
draft, and at the same time cast about for ways to encourage volun­
teering in order that the state might avoid conscription. He pressed 
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advice upon Stanton, urging that the Secretary allow men to come 
home from the front to recruit companies in return for a commission. 
The recommendation irritated men remaining in the field and led 
to the only serious difficulties Tod had with officers at the front— 
many of whom refused to recognize commissions he had given for 
recruiting. Tod himself realized that in his efforts to popularize en­
listment he had appointed some incompetent officers, and he asked 
Stanton to set up an examining board in Kentucky to eliminate some 
of them. He also got a requisition from Stanton for $1,000 to em­
ploy speakers in efforts to encourage enlistment.45 
Despite all of Tod's efforts, recruiting was slow; and it was ap­
parent the state would have to draft militia. Even before the date 
set for the August draft, Tod's mail was filled with requests for exemp­
tion. The governor took it upon himself to exempt state and county 
officials and as a railroad man, fruitlessly pleaded for the exception 
of railroad employees. Also without authority, he allowed conscien­
tious objectors to pay a commutation fee of $200 to avoid service. 
Twice, in an effort to avoid it entirely, Tod got the draft postponed. 
However, on October 1, he had to order a draft of 12,251 to com­
plete the state quota. Of that number, 2000 were discharged for 
various causes, 4800 enlisted for three years, 2400 were conscripted, 
and the balance failed to respond. Subsequent enlistments more 
than made up the deficiencies in the draft.46 
Tod continued to besiege Stanton with appeals for assistance and 
suggestions on recruiting methods. His frequent correspondence with 
the War Department led even dynamic Governor Andrew of Massa­
chusetts to wish that he might "perhaps be allowed—as Tod—in 
my letters to Mr. Stanton to make a humble suggestion, sometimes." 
The Ohio governor pleaded with Stanton to supply him with muster­
ing officers and pay for regiments that had completed their terms of 
service; he also complained that he had over 20,000 men in camp 
with no blankets or clothing. Displaying a questionable acquaintance 
with the Bible, he thundered: "I know not where the fault is, and 
it is well that I do not, for I would whip the fellow ere he was as 
strong as Methuselah."47 
In September Tod took time off from the arduous labors of raising 
troops to journey to Altoona, Pennsylvania for a meeting with the 
governors of the loyal states. John Andrew and other New England 
governors planned to raise Negro troops in order to avoid drafting 
their citizens. Radical Republicans, anxious for a war to end slavery 
and destroy Southern political and economic power, planned to force 
their program on the President, while moderates like Tod and Penn­
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sylvania's Governor Andrew G. Curtin hoped the conference would 
uphold administration policy. On September 23, the day before the 
governors met, Lincoln issued a preliminary Emancipation Proclama­
tion, cutting the ground from under the radicals. The next day, when 
Andrew demanded General McClellan's removal and offered resolu­
tions hailing the Emancipation Proclamation, Tod declared the people 
of Ohio would rise up and repudiate such treatment of the army 
commander. He then successfully substituted more conservative reso­
lutions on emancipation. Both Dennison and Tod had previously de­
fended McClellan from radical criticism, and Tod had asked Stanton 
to "for God's sake stop the wrangling between the friends of McClel­
lan and yourself in Congress. I ask this as the friend of both." Such 
action might have gained Tod McClellan's gratitude, but it cost him 
valuable support among radicals in Ohio.48 
The Emancipation Proclamation capped a series of developments 
tending to disrupt the Union Republican organization and add strength 
to the Democratic party in Ohio as well as elsewhere. As the fall 
elections came near in the Buckeye state, Republicans had to cope 
with widespread discouragement at the failure of McClellan's Peninsu­
lar Campaign and the defeat at Second Manassas. Radical Repub­
licans chafed angrily at Lincoln's removal of abolitionist General 
Fremont, while conservatives were equally alarmed at Congressional 
confiscation acts and the use of Negroes to suppress the rebellion. 
Democrats also benefited from popular reaction to the arrest of sev­
eral Democratic newspaper editors in Ohio. The Emancipation Proc­
lamation turned many more conservatives away from the Union party. 
Consequently the Democratic candidates, running on a platform of 
"Union as it has been and the Constitution as it is," carried their 
state ticket by a majority of 5,577 and won fourteen of nineteen 
Congressional districts. However, Clement Vallandigham of Dayton, 
leading Copperhead Congressman, failed in his bid for re-election 
after Republicans gerrymandered his district.49 
On January 5, 1863, in his annual message to the legislature, Tod 
made no reference to confiscation or the Emancipation Proclamation, 
but instead spoke only of the need of maintaining the war effort. 
Believing the President and the administration had acted correctly 
to restore peace and harmony, Tod admitted he had acquiesced in 
orders for military arrests and suspension of the writ of habeas corpus 
in Ohio. The question of man's capacity for self-government, which 
he had raised in his inaugural, Tod found yet unanswered. In order 
for Ohio to aid more fully in settling that issue, he asked the legisla­
ture for better provisions for soldiers' families, a more efficient militia 
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organization, and support for a military school. Tod ended by sug­
gesting the Union party could avoid another defeat at the polls by 
enacting legislation to allow soldiers in the field to vote. Stanton 
found Tod's message "manly and patriotic," while Gideon Welles, 
Secretary of the Navy, termed it "wholesome and vigorous."50 
As the new year progressed, Tod's relations with his legislature 
became more and more strained; the governor was often impatient 
and even dictatorial with the solons, who resented his peremptory 
demands for legislation. Democrats and conservative Unionists were 
angry with the military arrests he had sanctioned in the state, while 
radical legislators were unhappy about his failure to support emanci­
pation. They also complained that Tod allowed rebel officers in 
Columbus prison camps to have the run of the city, while he refused 
to release Negro prisoners taken after the Fort Donelson campaign. 
Republicans protested that Tod's appointment policy gave almost all 
the important offices in the state either to Democrats or Democratic 
Unionists. When the Republican state auditor moved up into a Treas­
ury Department position, Tod ignored a legislative petition and gave 
the vacated post to a Democrat who had headed the defeated Union 
ticket in 1862. Promptly Secretary Chase joined Republican state 
legislators in complaints. In the General Assembly, Tod's proposal 
for a reorganization of the militia met much partisan opposition, and 
only in the last hours of the session was the bill passed. Although 
the measure came too late to help Tod much in organizing the state 
to repel Confederate cavalry raids, it did enable his successor, John 
Brough, at a critical moment to raise hurriedly 40,000 National Guards 
to send to Washington.51 
Tod's troubles with the legislature were only a part of the difficulties 
he faced as his second year began. By November, 1862, the governor 
had been able to fill all of Ohio's troop quotas, but he had reached the 
limit of his ability to enlist volunteers. On the first day of February, 
1863, he wrote Stanton to inform him that if the government wanted 
more troops, the Secretary would have to produce a uniform system 
of drafting: "With this Ohio will respond to any further calls 
made upon her, but without it it would be impossible to raise any 
considerable number." Tod was not alone in his opinion: in March, 
Republican congressmen passed a national Enrollment Act, which for 
the first time asserted the power of the federal government to raise 
troops without state assistance. Under the law, the federal govern­
ment created enrollment districts in the states and appointed provost 
marshals to enroll men, assign quotas, and offer exemptions. The 
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enrollment proceeded immediately as the provost-marshal general 
began drafting in states deficient under previous calls.82 
Although Ohio was excluded from the first draft, on June 15, Tod 
got an urgent request from Washington for 30,000 militia to protect 
eastern Ohio and western Pennsylvania and Virginia from rebel at­
tack—Lee was launching a new invasion of the North. The Ohio 
governor issued a proclamation exhorting his constituents: "To the 
rescue then at once, and thus save all that is dear to man." At the 
same time, he asked Stan ton if the militia thus busily saving "all 
that is dear to man" might be exempt from a possible draft; Stanton 
said no. Tod also complained to Stanton that another draft was 
scheduled to begin almost at the same time as Ohio's fall elections; 
Stanton agreed the "evil is so obvious" that the draft would be post­
poned. The governor, operating on the information from the Sec­
retary, went a step farther than the facts warranted in informing 
Ohioans that there would be no draft in the state. Fortunately, his 
prediction came true when an examination of the statistics proved 
that Ohio had filled its quota. However, on October 17, Lincoln 
called for another 300,000 men, with a draft to follow in January if 
the states did not meet the call. The federal government was using 
the draft only to force governors to redouble their efforts to enlist 
volunteers.53 
Although Tod himself had suggested a uniform draft system, he 
was still anxious to avoid conscription if possible. He continued to 
urge the federal government to offer generous bounties and to let 
men at the front come home to recruit in return for a commission. 
In September, the provost-marshal general assented to his request 
and instructed commanding generals to send men to Ohio for recruit­
ing duty. But, however anxious Tod was to fill state quotas by vol­
unteering, he was hesitant to accept the services of Negro troops. Dur­
ing the first two years of the war, both he and Dennison had re­
fused to use Negroes petitioning to assist in the war effort. Tod 
pleaded that the law did not permit him to accept the military services 
of colored men. Even after January, 1863, when Lincoln authorized 
the raising of Negro regiments, Tod refused to enlist any colored 
troops, and let Andrew of Massachusetts organize Negroes in Ohio. 
He did make sure that his state would receive credit on its own quotas 
for the colored troops Andrew raised. Finally, in June, when Andrew 
refused to take more colored troops and it seemed clear that Ohio 
was not getting full credit for all Negroes enlisted within her borders, 
Tod agreed to raise a colored regiment of his own. Since the law 
providing relief of soldiers' families did not apply to Negroes, Tod 
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appointed a committee including ex-Governor Dennison to raise vol­
untary subscriptions for that purpose.54 
While Tod busily raised troops for service in the federal armies 
outside the state, he also had to maintain defenses at home. Denni­
son's actions and Union troop movements had already relieved any 
immediate threat of invasion from below the Ohio River, but Tod 
lived in constant fear of cavalry raids up through Kentucky or western 
Virginia. In June, 1862, he suggested that Stanton provide an organ­
ized force in Ohio for defensive purposes in case the Confederates 
came through the Cumberland Gap or up the Kanawha river. He 
also wanted a strong Union force in Kentucky.58 
In the early summer of 1862, in spite of Tod's concern for the 
state's safety, most Ohioans felt secure—Confederate General P. G. T. 
Beauregard had evacuated Corinth; Memphis had fallen; Buell was 
moving toward Chattanooga; and Kentucky, under the supervision 
of a state military board, was raising volunteers for the Union army. 
Suddenly, on July 11, a news dispatch from Kentucky dispelled the 
calm—the Confederate raider John Morgan was storming through 
the Bluegrass, reportedly heading for Lexington. Cincinnatians, fear­
ing Morgan was on his way to their city, milled anxiously in the 
streets, listening to varying reports about the size, speed, and destina­
tion of the Confederate force. Tod quickly sent the only troops he 
could find—convalescents from Camps Dennison and Chase—to re­
inforce the frightened city. He also asked former Governor Dennison 
to visit Cincinnati and to consult with Ohio troops that had hastily 
gathered in Frankfort, Kentucky. Despite the excitement and frantic 
activity, Morgan never threatened Cincinnati, and the crisis soon passed. 
But Tod had received proof that his fears about Ohio's southern 
border were not groundless.58 
On July 30, Tod had an interview with Judge Richard A. Buckner, 
of Kentucky, and a committee of "highly respectable gentlemen" 
from Cincinnati, who told him they feared a raid on the Kentucky 
legislature when it assembled the next week. Tod thereupon asked 
Stanton to send several three-month regiments to Frankfort and hur­
ried the committee on to Washington to consult further with the 
Secretary. Tod warned the governors of Illinois and Indiana of the 
danger and detailed the steps he had taken to meet it. He assured 
Yates in Illinois that Lincoln and Stanton had promised to raise 
troop in Kentucky and put gunboats on the Ohio River. Once again, 
however, the threat failed to materialize.87 
The months of July and August were comparatively quiet along 
the border; but just at the end of the latter month, Kentucky again 
29

OHIO'S CIVIL WAR GOVERNORS 
erupted as Confederate General Kirby Smith, followed by Morgan, 
led 12,000 men straight into the heart of the state. On the first of 
September, Smith triumphantly entered Lexington; two days later, 
he dispatched several thousand men toward Covington and Cincinnati. 
News of the invasion reached Cincinnati the night of August 30; 
but this time no panic ensued, as citizens discounted the threat. How­
ever, when Cincinnatians learned that Union troops were falling back 
on Louisville, leaving nothing but the Ohio River between their city 
and Smith's cavalry, they began to take alarm. As the City Council 
hurriedly sought to organize Cincinnati's defenses, General H. G. 
Wright, commander of the Department of the Ohio, ordered General 
Lew Wallace to the Queen City to assume command and defend 
the town. Immediately upon his arrival, before most citizens knew 
exactly what was happening, Wallace declared martial law, suspend­
ed all business, and stopped ferryboats, in spite of the warning from 
one of his friends that "if the enemy should not come after all this 
fuss you will be ruined."58 
While Wallace was busy issuing proclamations, forming military 
organizations, and throwing up breastworks across the Ohio River, 
Governor Tod hurried down to examine the situation for himself. 
He telegraphed his adjutant-general to forward all available troops 
and sent out warnings to communities along the border, declaring 
that "the soil of Ohio must not be invaded by the enemies of our glor­
ious Government." Tod found great confusion in Cincinnati, and 
was unable to learn of the whereabouts of the enemy. Nevertheless, 
he issued a proclamation the night of September 2, announcing that 
he would accept all armed companies and squads of men who wished 
to defend the city. Before daybreak on the 3rd, the "Squirrel Hunt­
ers," as the hastily-organized irregulars became known, were filing 
through the streets. In the meantime, Tod sought to secure border 
defenses elsewhere. Summoning all his epistolary talents in an attempt 
to bolster the morale of a worried captain in Gallipolis, he urged him 
to "stand firm and show your blood. Should you fall I will escort 
your remains home."59 
Several days passed and no enemy appeared. Cincinnati was jammed 
to overflowing with "Squirrel Hunters," and some of them, aggrieved 
because Wallace had shut down the beer parlors but not the street 
cars, began tearing up railroad tracks. Cincinnati businessmen com­
plained at the continuance of martial law and protested that the people 
could get neither bread nor medicine while all the shops were closed. 
General Wright finally removed Wallace from command, sent him 
across the Ohio River to superintend defenses there, and reopened 
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the city's businesses. He asked Tod to stem the flow of armed men 
into Cincinnati; the governor issued another proclamation, praising 
Ohioans for their "noble and generous response," but adding that no 
more volunteers were needed. After a few more false alarms, on 
September 13, Tod announced the safety of Cincinnati and sent the 
volunteers home at state expense. In May, 1863, nine months after 
the Kirby Smith raid, when the question of Tod's renomination came 
up, the governor conveniently recalled his Squirrel Hunters and issued 
to each and every one of them a "beautiful lithographic discharge" 
with his picture engraved on the back.60 
Not until July, 1863, were Tod's worst fears regarding Confederate 
invasion realized: in that month, Morgan again entered Kentucky, 
and this time he did not stop until he reached Ohio soil. Despite the 
experiences of the preceding summer, danger of invasion again threw 
Ohio into great confusion. Morgan, with 3,000 horsemen, reached 
the Ohio River on July 8, crossed the stream to enter Indiana, and 
then turned northeast toward Cincinnati. On July 12, Tod, an­
nouncing the state was in imminent danger of invasion, called out 
militia companies in the southern counties. The next day, while 
rural communities were reading Tod's appeal for troops, Morgan 
was moving through the suburbs of Cincinnati, clashing only once 
with pickets at Camp Dennison. Residents of southern Ohio, panic-
stricken and confused by contradictory reports of Morgan's move­
ments, frantically hid their silver spoons and drove their stock into 
the woods. One housewife protected the family carriage-horse by 
stabling it in the parlor. Militia troops poured into the countryside 
in hot pursuit of the Confederate raider; in all, over 50,000 Ohioans 
took the field against Morgan, and not half of them ever got within 
60 miles of their quarry. 
On July 19, Ohio militia and Union cavalry trapped Morgan at 
the Ohio River and captured most of his force. Morgan and a few 
hundred men got away, and for a week evaded their pursuers. Tod, 
frantic at the failure to find the elusive Confederate, hastily wrote 
a militia officer at Cleveland that "Morgan may yet reach the lake 
shore!" On July 26, Morgan finally fell into the hands of Union 
troops, who put him in a penitentiary in Columbus. Four months 
later, he escaped and fled the state, leaving behind him a rattled 
executive facing claims for over $600,000 in damages as a consequence 
of the raid. Tod, adding the expense of putting the militia into the 
field, estimated that Morgan cost the State of Ohio over one million 
dollars. After the scare was over, Democratic newspapers and even 
some Republican sheets criticized Tod for calling out too many men, 
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forcing them to leave their farms and workbenches to mill fruitlessly 
in the fields; Sam Medary termed the whole episode "Tod's Military 
Elephant."61 
Tod also worried about the security of the various military prisons 
in Ohio; particularly, he thought that the Johnson's Island camp, 
situated in Lake Erie just north of Sandusky, was susceptible to Con­
federate attack from Canada. In the early summer of 1862, he asked 
Stanton for troops to strengthen the garrison there and also suggested 
that Welles send a naval steamer to the vicinity. Again in October, 
1863, Tod asked Stanton to increase the guard on the island, and he 
obtained a revenue steamer to aid in guarding the prisoners. When, 
in November, Stanton informed the governors of Ohio, Pennsylvania, 
Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and New York that Confederates were 
plotting to raid Buffalo and Johnson's Island, Tod sent 500 troops 
from Cleveland and gathered volunteer militia at strategic points 
along the lake shore. Confederates actually attempted to seize a ship 
and cross Lake Erie in order to free rebel prisoners, but were quickly 
apprehended, ending the threat to Ohio's northern border.62 
Not all the dangers that Tod worried about were external: within 
the state, the governor battled with recalcitrant Democrats, unruly 
newspaper editors, draft rioters, and strange secret societies. As he 
struggled to raise troops to meet the various calls from the federal 
government, Tod grew angry with antiwar Democrats whom he 
charged with discouraging enlistments. During the summer of 1862, 
under the authority of the President's proclamation suspending the 
writ of habeas corpus, federal authorities arrested eleven Ohioans 
for seeking to subvert the war effort. They made two arrests at the di­
rect request of Governor Tod. Democrats condemned the action as 
arbitrary, unconstitutional, and unwarranted; Tod answered that the 
men had committed treason by interfering with the defense of the 
federal government. In early 1863, a select committee of the Gen­
eral Assembly—controlled by Republicans—investigated the arrests 
and found that they were indeed necessary to the safety of the gov­
ernment.63 
The first man arrested on Tod's recommendation was Edson B. 
Olds, a leading peace Democrat from Lancaster. On July 29, 1862, 
Tod warned Secretary of State Seward that Olds was a "shrewd, 
cunning man, with capacity for great mischief, and should at once 
be put out of the way." On August 12, Federal authorities impris­
oned Olds and followed up the arrest with several others. Tod 
threatened Democratic newspaper editors who loudly protested Olds' 
imprisonment. Several witnesses asserted the governor had warned 
32 
OHIO'S CIVIL WAR GOVERNORS 
the editor of the Ohio Eagle that "I am to be the judge of what you 
may and may not say, constitutions and laws notwithstanding." The 
Olds case quickly became a cause celebre for the Democratic press, 
which got further editorial material after March, 1863, when the 
much-discussed prisoner was released. Olds obtained a warrant for 
Tod's arrest on a kidnapping charge. He and John W Kees, another 
victim of Tod's arbitrary actions, also filed suits against the governor 
for a total of $130,000 in damages. When Tod was arrested on 
the kidnapping charge, the state Supreme Court immediately granted 
him a writ of habeas corpus—which had been denied to Olds the 
year before. The case dragged on for several months before it was 
finally dropped, along with the damage suits.84 
To Tod, such Democratic editors and politicians were only part 
of a greater conspiracy to destroy the Union War effort. Correspondents 
throughout the state kept him informed of "disloyal organizations" 
with secret signs and oaths which busily plotted against the govern­
ment. On February 23, 1863, Tod met in Cincinnati with Indiana's 
Governor Morton, ex-Governors Dennison and Joseph A. Wright, 
of Indiana, General Lew Wallace, and other military officers. The 
various dignitaries spoke to a Union mass meeting held at the city 
opera house. Tod assured his listeners that he spoke for the Demo­
cratic party—the party of Jackson, not the "bastard Democratic party" 
that opposed the war. He defended the Olds arrest, and attacked 
southern sympathizers who refused to volunteer and discouraged the 
enlistment of others. Lew Wallace then rose and warned of terrible 
dangers threatening Ohio—dangers that came not from rebel camps 
but from within the state itself. The General had detected a "wide­
spread and insidious conspiracy" of 80,000 Ohioans, who were dedi­
cated either to stopping the war or promoting a western confederacy. 
In order to defeat the plans of these insurrectionaries, Wallace ad­
vised loyal citizens to "organize not politically, but in the style of 
soldiers."*5 
Though Wallace could find little proof of such a widespread con­
spiracy to pull the Northwest out of the Union, there was plenty 
of evidence that many citizens objected to being drafted into the 
federal armies. The governors of Indiana, Wisconsin, and Pennsyl­
vania encountered resistance in 1862 as they applied the militia draft; 
and in the following year, more serious disturbances broke out in 
New York and Ohio. In June, as drafting began in Ohio under the 
national conscription act, Tod applied for Stanton for troops to "guar­
antee the peace and quiet of the state." He stationed guards at an­
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ticipated trouble spots in an effort to avoid any wide-spread resistance 
to enrollment and drafting.66 
In spite of Tod's precautions, by the middle of June Ohio's assistant 
provost-marshal general reported armed resistance to the draft in at 
least four counties. The most serious disturbances occurred in Holmes 
County, where irate citizens attacked an enrollment officer and freed 
several men federal officials had arrested. Colonel William Wallace, 
commander of United States forces in Ohio, who was ordered to 
the scene, expected to find the malcontents armed with cannon and 
in a fortified camp. Tod, hoping to avoid bloodshed, issued a proc­
lamation calling on the draft resisters to disperse; if they didn't, the 
governor warned of consequences "destructive in the extreme." He 
asked Wallace to present this proclamation under a flag of truce; 
if the rioters refused to disband, Wallace was to "show them no 
quarter whatever." The colonel, commanding a force of 230 men 
hastily gathered from several nearby army camps, found the rioters 
huddled behind some rocks. His force easily scattered the opposition, 
killing two and wounding several. The next day the insurgents 
agreed to surrender the men who had attacked the enrollment officer, 
and peace returned to Holmes County. In July, Tod again indicated 
his willingness to shed blood if necessary to conduct enrollments; 
he told the mayor of Cleveland that if rioters interfered with drafting 
in his city, guards should use no blank cartridges.67 
Despite Tod's activities in raising troops, fending off invasion, and 
quelling riots, he did not forget that 1863 was an election year. In 
early May, he told a Union gathering at Mahoning that he would 
"consent to be a candidate for another term." He also attacked peace 
Democrats and defended the actions of the Lincoln administration. 
During the speech, which the Mahoning Sentinel labelled as the 
"Opening 'Bawl' of the Abolition Campaign," the governor reminded 
his listeners of his immense labors during the past year. He modestly 
confessed that "ministering comfort and consolation to the friends, 
the widows, mothers and sisters of my gallant boys has occupied 
much of my time."68 
Tod was telling the truth; from the first days of his administration, 
the governor had outdone himself in efforts to provide for his con­
stituents serving in the Union armies. In April, 1862, after the battle 
of Shiloh, Tod sent a hospital ship to the scene and sought to remove 
wounded Ohio soldiers to hospitals at Cincinnati. He asked the Ohio 
assembly for "extraordinary power and discretion" in order to ap­
point additional surgeons, nurses, and agents for Ohio regiments in 
the field, and wanted permission to employ such transportation as 
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was necessary to get the wounded into Ohio hospitals. He sent special 
agents to Washington, Louisville, Cincinnati, and New York to aid 
disabled soldiers in obtaining their back pay, bounties, and pensions. 
He established several other agencies both within and outside the 
state to care for sick, disabled, and straggling Ohio soldiers. In June, 
Tod sent a special messenger to confer with the Medical Department 
of the Army about getting some reimbursement from the federal 
government for expenses incurred in removing sick and wounded 
soldiers in the Tennessee and Cumberland valleys. Tod also wanted 
to know why the federal government refused to recognize the fifty 
state surgeons he had appointed to serve in Ohio regiments. Once 
again he called on former Governor Dennison, sending him to visit 
Ohio troops in Cincinnati and Kentucky to see that they were well 
equipped and healthy. By the end of the year, Tod estimated that 
he had spent a total of $127,071 for removing sick and wounded 
from battlefields, for assistant surgeons, and for sanitary agents and 
supplies. Tod hopefully charged the expenses to the federal govern­
ment.69 
In 1863, the battles of Stone's River, Vicksburg, and Gettysburg 
kept Tod busy sending more boats—which the federal government 
now refused to use—surgeons, nurses, and agents to ease the suffering 
of the wounded. He tried to get paroled Ohio prisoners and hospital 
patients removed to their home state as soon as possible, and several 
times demanded that Washington authorities remove incompetent 
directors in federal hospitals. He extended the system of state agencies 
to Nashville, Memphis, Keokuk, Harper's Ferry, Cairo, St. Louis, and 
Madison, Iowa. By the end of his term of office, Tod had indeed 
won the title of "the soldier's friend."70 
As the 1863 state campaign moved closer, Ohioans gave more and 
more attention to politics. Both Ohio and Pennsylvania had guberna­
torial elections in October, and the results of the contests would prove 
crucial to the Republican party. If the Democrats could carry both 
states in the fall, they might well elect a President the following 
year. Thus, the selection of gubernatorial candidates was very im­
portant for both parties. 
Ohio Democrats, exhuberant after their victory in the 1862 elections, 
had become bolder in their attacks on both the state and federal admin­
istrations. Their acknowledged leader, ex-Congressman Clement L. Val­
landigham, took the stump early in March to denounce war and con­
scription. Though not all Democrats agreed with him on the need 
for peace, they could unite in opposition to an abolitionist war and 
in defense of constitutional liberties. However, Vallandigham's speech­
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es proved too extreme for General Ambrose E. Burnside, commander 
of the Department of the Ohio. In May, the General's men arrested 
Vallandigham and tried him before a military court martial. The 
military court, in turn, sentenced him to prison for attempting to hinder 
the prosecution of the war. Burnside's action ensured Vallandigham's 
nomination by the Democrats; on June 11, they named him and George 
Pugh to head their ticket. The platform proved more conservative 
than the candidates; the Democrats sought only their rights under the 
Constitution, recognized their allegiance to the government, and pro­
tested emancipation and martial law. The convention refused to de­
clare in favor of an immediate end to the war or for separation of 
the warring sections.71 
A week later, Republicans met at Columbus to select their candidates. 
Just as his predecessor, Dennison, had failed to satisfy important 
elements in his party, so David Tod had managed to antagonize many 
influential factions within the Republican "Union" organization. 
Through his role in making military arrests, he had alarmed con­
servative Unionists; on the other hand, Tod had embittered Ohio 
radicals by appointing Democrats to several state offices and by re­
fusing to defend the Emancipation Proclamation. Ohio's Union 
Leagues, dominated by radicals, refused to support him. In addition, 
Democrats smeared Tod for his role in the sale of a canal company 
— in which the state had invested heavily — to the Mahoning rail­
road. Democratic sleuths found that Tod was president of both the 
canal and the railroad, thus benefitting from the sale at public ex­
72 pense.
More important, railroad issues were considered in addition to the 
questions of abolition, canals, and military arrests. Governor Tod, 
a railroad president, had no interest in a current scheme for consolidat­
ing railroad lines from the Alleghenies to the Mississippi. The roads 
that sought the consolidation found a champion in the president of 
another line, John Brough, an old Ohio Democrat who had been liv­
ing in Indiana for several years. The two leading Republican news­
papers of Cincinnati, the Gazette and the Commercial, united in putting 
Brough's name before the Republican convention. Here was the 
answer for Republican politicians seeking a man on whom all factions 
of the party could unite. During the war, Brough had been out of 
the state; he had not expressed his views on any of the significant 
issues of the day and, consequently, had antagonized no one. Repub­
lican masterminds hoped Brough's long-time Democratic affiliation 
would strengthen the "Unionist" appeal of their party. Consequently, 
Brough edged Tod for the nomination in a close vote, 216 to 193­
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Two years before, Dennison had paid the price for failing to satisfy 
the various interests and factions of his party; now Tod suffered the 
same fate. Just as he had replaced his predecessor at the dictation of 
political expediency, now Tod in turn had lost his job for similar 
78 reasons.
The governor, angry with the results of the convention, wired 
Lincoln that "personal considerations alone were the cause of my 
defeat." Lincoln regretted Tod had not been nominated, but said 
he had nothing against Brough. "On the contrary, like yourself, I 
say hurrah for him." Tod assured the President that he would do all 
in his power to secure Brough's election. He also continued to work 
diligently to serve out the rest of his term.74 
In Tod's final message to the legislature, delivered on January 4, 
1864, he reviewed the past year, finding that the state government 
had cared for Ohio's wounded soldiers, repelled border raids, and 
given conclusive evidence of a determination to uphold the national 
government. Reminding the legislators that Ohio now had a total 
of 200,671 troops in the field, he asked them to increase the tax levy 
for the support of soldiers' families. Tod also hoped the solons would 
grant his successor an increase in salary.75 
Tod was in ill health as he closed out his administration. Govern­
ing the state of Ohio through two years of war had worn him out; 
he had worked hard to fulfill the obligations of his office. Although 
he, as Brough, had been selected more for his political qualifications 
than for executive ability, Tod had demonstrated considerable capabil­
ity in meeting the problems of raising and providing for state troops. 
He had dutifully served the cause of the Lincoln administration, a 
fact that the President recognized. In June, 1864, Secretary of the 
Treasury Chase resigned and Lincoln turned to the former governor 
to fill the post. When Lincoln's secretary, John Hay, asked the Presi­
dent why he had selected Tod, Lincoln replied that "he is my friend, 
with a big head full of brains he made a good governor, and 
has made a fortune for himself." However, radical opposition to Tod's 
conservatism on slavery, plus doubts of his qualifications for the post, 
made it clear the Senate would never accept the nomination. Lincoln 
refused to withdraw Tod's name, and the ex-governor himself, plead­
ing ill health, solved the problem by declining the position. During 
the remainder of the war, Tod, along with Dennison, continued to 
give his support to the Union party in Ohio.78 
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JOHN BROUGH

The Union party's new gubernatorial candidate, John Brough, of 
Marietta, had been prominent in Democratic circles before the war. 
However, since 1844, when he had turned to devote his entire energies 
to running railroads, he had been inactive in politics. After he became 
president of the Madison and Indianapolis railroad, he moved to 
Indiana. In I860, Brough had opposed Lincoln's election; but after 
the outset of war, he had refused to join in attacks on the administra­
tion. In 1863, when the anti-Tod forces in Ohio decided to nominate 
Brough, they brought him back to his home town, where, on June 
10, he delivered a strong speech in behalf of the Union cause. Brough 
declared that, like a soldier, it was his duty to obey the President. 
He admitted he had not approved the Emancipation Proclamation, 
but he thought slavery was bound to perish in the war. Brough also 
justified confiscation and military arrests and appealed to patriots of 
all parties to unite against the Southern insurgents. Brough's backers 
made sure his fiery speech was widely circulated; within a week, they 
had gained him the Unionist party's nomination.77 
The fifty-three-year-old politician-turned-railroader had a reputation 
for rough and ready politics with a temperament to match. Brough's 
heavy, corpulent body and loose attire seemed to indicate a lack of 
vigor and determination, but this was belied by his stern face and 
firm mouth. A blunt, outspoken, rude man who loved to chew to­
bacco, he presented quite a contrast to his two handsome and dignified 
predecessors, Dennison and Tod. Unlike them, Brough had had to 
struggle to make a name for himself in Ohio; he had risen to party 
prominence and railroad presidencies only after making many enemies. 
Orphaned in 1821 at the age of eleven, Brough had become a 
printer's apprentice, and in ten years was publishing his own news­
papers, first in Marietta and then in Lancaster. A strongly partisan 
Jackson Democrat, Brought wrote sarcastic editorials that spared no 
one. In 1837, Brough won a seat in the Ohio House of Representatives, 
where he promoted fugitive slave bills, attacked abolitionists, and sup­
ported Ohio's black laws. Although he was only 26, he became 
chairman of the house committee on banks and currency; his efforts 
there to reform state currency and apply strict limits to banking ac­
tivity won for him, despite the opposition of Sam Medary, the post 
of state auditor. Brough held the job for six years, and busily un­
covered tax loopholes and school fund defalcations, fought debt re­
pudiation, and sought to improve the whole state taxation system. 
In 1841, he and his brother bought a Cincinnati paper, renamed it 
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The Enquirer, and used it to increase Brough's political renown. In 
its columns Brough attacked Whigs and even Democrats who re­
fused to support his bank policy. During the early 1840's Brough's 
many enemies abused him maliciously, and he never apologized for 
the keenness of his sarcasm in responding. When the editor of the 
Louisville Courier-Journal, describing Brough's immensity, wrote, 
If flesh is grass as people say 
Then Johnny Brough's a load of hay 
the harrassed auditor responded that he supposed he was hay, "judg­
ing from the number of asses that were nibbling at him."78 
In 1844, Whigs took over the state administration and Brough turned 
to forwarding his railroad career: in 1848, he became president of 
the Madison and Indianapolis railroad, then of the Bellefontaine 
line, and finally became head of the Indianapolis, Pittsburgh, and 
Cleveland railway. During the 185O's he busily promoted an Illinois 
road that would connect his lines with the Mississippi. Abraham 
Lincoln lobbied against his project. After the war started, Demo­
cratic papers, and even George B. Wright, Dennison s quarter-master 
general, accused Brough of refusing to transport sick and wounded 
Ohio soldiers for half-fare. In 1863, Brough accepted the nomina­
tion only after a friend volunteered to take over his duties as railroad 
president and allow Brough the salary.79 
The Unionist Republicans had picked a good candidate. Brough 
was an excellent stump speaker, a quality hitherto lacking in the party's 
gubernatorial nominees. Although Brough seemed to many to be 
hard-hearted and ill-natured, voters were attracted by his lack of pre­
tense, wide experience, and reputation for honesty. For Ohioans who 
supported the war effort and feared Copperhead plots, Brough's out­
spokenness seemed to be just what was needed to defeat Clement Val­
landigham. Although he had added flesh with years, Brough was still 
the fiery politician of old, and he soon warmed to the excitement of 
the campaign. On July 8, in a stormy speech in Cleveland, he thun­
dered, "Either slavery must be torn out root and branch, or our Gov­
ernment will exist no longer." In September, Brough asserted Val­
landigham's election "would be an invitation to the rebels in arms to 
come up and take possession of our soil." On the capital steps in 
Columbus, he told an audience that loyal Ohioans would go to war 
rather than accept Vallandigham as their governor. Brough's vigor­
ous campaigning was supplemented by the work of Tod, Senators 
Sherman and Wade, and Governors Morton, of Indiana, and Yates, 
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of Illinois, while Democrats imported Daniel W. Voorhees and 
Thomas A. Hendricks from Indiana. Despite the intensity of the 
canvass mobs rioted only once, wrecking Samuel Medary's newspaper 
office.80 
Although Republicans, including President Abraham Lincoln, were 
enormously concerned about the results of the Ohio election, the out­
come was never in doubt. The peace issue weakened the Democratic 
party, and Unionist candidates benefited from optimism generated 
by federal victories in the East and the opening of the Mississippi in 
the West. Republicans organized "Strong Bands" and Union Leagues 
to combat alleged secret Democratic organizations and to stir en­
thusiasm for their candidate. The Ohio legislature had taken Tod's 
advice and had drawn up legislation permitting Ohio soldiers in the 
field to vote; when their returns came in, Brough received over 41,000 
votes to Vallandigham's 2,388. President Lincoln authorized a fifteen-
day leave for Ohio clerks in Washington to enable them to go home 
to vote; Secretary Chase, who had not been in Ohio since the war 
began, led the migration. Brough, benefitting from this assistance 
and from the largest vote in Ohio's history dealt a shattering blow 
to Copperheadism, burying Vallandigham by over 100,000 votes. 
Lincoln, who confessed to Gideon Welles that he had been more 
concerned over the Ohio election than his own in I860, stayed up all 
night to get the results; early on October 14, Tod notified him that 
Brough's majority would be over 30,000, and at 5 a.m. Brough himself 
reported that he would win by over 100,000. Lincoln wired joyously 
in return: "Glory to God in the Highest, Ohio has saved the nation."81 
The victorious candidate delivered his inaugural address on January 
11, 1864. He told the assembled legislators that the election repre­
sented a "spontaneous declaration of the intense loyalty of our people 
to their government." Brough, seeing the end of the rebellion rapidly 
approaching, declared, "As we have not provoked this war, but sought 
rather to avoid it, we are not responsible for its consequences." He 
warned against negotiating with rebels in arms and demanded that 
fighting continue until the Southerners had surrendered uncondition­
ally. Subjugation of the South, he felt, was the only certain means 
of success. Looking ahead to the problems of reconstruction, Brough 
asserted that when the war was over, loyal citizens of the South would 
emerge in enough numbers to trust them with the restored state gov­
ernments.82 
The new governor soon found himself in the swirl of problems 
and pressures that had faced his predecessors: he had to continue 
raising troops, wrestle with the federal draft, provide for Ohio's 
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soldiers in the field, stand guard against secret societies, and protect 
his own political interests. 
In late April, in one of his first important actions in an official 
capacity, Brough, together with the governors of Illinois, Indiana, and 
Iowa, visited Lincoln in Washington. General Ulysses S. Grant had 
just started to move south toward Richmond, and was asking for all 
the troops the federal government could muster. The governors, 
following Brough's recommendation, suggested that their states pro­
vide militia to serve for 100 days to hold forts and railroads around 
Washington, so that Grant could throw his whole strength against 
the rebel army. Lincoln agreed to the proposition and directed Stan­
ton to execute it. 
Under the plan, Brough pledged Ohio to provide 30,000 National 
Guards. The men were to be mustered in by May 2, with no bounty 
and no credit on any subsequent draft. Brough immediately went to 
work to raise the militia, catching the War Department napping— 
Stanton was late sending out mustering officers. The governor had 
soon raised more troops than he needed, but Stanton took them; Ohio 
eventually contributed over 34,000 militia for 100 days' service. Stan­
ton praised Brough for his "patriotism and determination to spare no 
sacrifice to overthrow the rebellion." However, Brough did 
not escape criticism for his action; Democratic newspapers charged 
the governor had broken faith by sending some of the men to the 
front although he had assured them their duties would be confined 
to garrisoning. Also, the federal government was slow in mustering 
out the Ohio militiamen upon termination of their service, causing 
the governor much embarrassment. On September 3, after most of the 
men had returned, Brough delivered a speech at Circleville, assuring 
the National Guards that without their service, "the cause of the 
Union in all human probability would have been lost." He refused to 
answer charges that his action had been unconstitutional, suggesting 
that if it had, then the troops had "violated the Constitution for the 
country's good."83 
Recruiting near the close of Tod's administration had left Ohio 
ahead of her quota under regular calls. However, in February, 1864, 
Lincoln issued a fresh request for volunteers; additional calls followed 
in March, July, and December. Although, by 1864, most governors 
were demanding abandonment of the draft or liberal extension of 
federal bounties, Brough wrote Stanton in March to declare his sup­
port for conscription. He pointed out that since the government had 
postponed a draft scheduled for March 10, recruiting in Ohio had 
virtually stopped. Men would only be raised, he asserted, when Ohio­
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ans realized the draft would be held. Brough also favored drafting 
for another reason—the state could ill afford to pay the high bounties 
used to encourage enlistment. Federal, state, county, and township 
bonuses multiplied until in some cases a soldier collected $1,000 
for volunteering. In spite of the bidding for recruits in Ohio, drafts 
had to be ordered for three of the four calls in 1864.84 
The drafts gave Brough much to worry about. Pausing in his efforts 
to meet the troop calls, quell suspected Copperhead plots, and en­
courage the Ohio National Guards being sent off to Washington, he 
asked Stanton if he had "anything cheering or consoling that you can 
give me?" Lincoln himself replied that "everything looks favorable 
for us." Brough, however, wanted more positive consolation; he felt 
if the state enrollment lists could be corrected, Ohio would not be 
liable to the draft. In July, when conscription began in the state, 
Brough complained that Ohio had an excess of 10,000 over previous 
calls. Provost Marshal General James B. Fry replied the draft would 
go on in delinquent districts, even though the whole state had an excess 
over the call. He expressed dismay that "the Governor should raise 
such a point to prevent the completion of a draft which was com­
menced at his earnest solicitation." Brough then asked that if the 
draft had to be made, the National Guards could be exempted so 
that shirks and stay-at-homes might be conscripted. The forty regi­
ments called out for 100 days, he argued, had sifted out the Union 
men; now the government should draft Copperheads. Such action 
"would be hailed with gratification throughout the state." Stanton 
refused, saying he could not interfere with the terms of arrangement 
for the draft. Ex-Governor Tod then wrote the Secretary of War to 
request a reduction in military forces asked from Ohio. Perhaps as 
a consequence of Tod's intervention, and certainly as a result of the 
revision of credits for calls prior to January 1, 1864, Stanton did reduce 
the state's quota.85 
As conscription proceeded in Ohio through the summer of 1864, 
Brough worried about the danger of secret societies. Early in the 
year he had organized a system of spies, and maintained that they 
had uncovered a secret, treasonable organization in the state number­
ing close to 100,000 men. According to Brough, the insurrectionaries 
planned to destroy railroads and telegraph lines, seize arsenals in 
Columbus, release prisoners at Camp Chase, and co-operate with John 
Morgan who would launch a raid from Kentucky. Perhaps sitting 
up all night to receive confidential reports affected Brough's judgment; 
at any rate, no organized rebellion ever broke out. Brough warned 
Ohioans about "evil counsellors and bad men" who conspired against 
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the government, and advised federal officers to arrest leaders of the 
opposition to the draft, including Vallandigham, whom federal author­
ities were allowing to travel in Ohio unmolested. In August, as a 
draft was about to begin in the state, Brough warned Stanton that 
"force, and a good deal of it, will be required to overawe the resistance 
party." The Secretary assured the worried governor that if he had 
to call out any military forces to repeal invasion or preserve internal 
peace, the troops would be armed and paid by the federal govern­
ment. Brough also worried about unrest in Kentucky and demanded 
that Washington authorities crack down on rebel sympathizers in 
the state. "Nothing but a vigorous application of Maryland policy," 
he asserted, "will save Kentucky, and the longer that is delayed the 
more dangerous Kentucky becomes."88 
Brough never hesitated to register his own opinions, regardless of 
the subject. In February, 1865, the contentious governor wrote Provost 
Marshal General Fry that the system of local bounties was full of 
corrupting influence that was traceable not so much to state and 
county government as to corrupt federal agents. Brough charged that 
at least half the provost marshals in Ohio should be removed. The 
governor also wrote fellow Ohioan Robert C. Schenck, of the House 
Military Affairs Committee, to complain of the red tape that hindered 
effective control of deputy provost marshals; he felt much corruption, 
delay, and expense could be eliminated by letting state authorities 
draft men under federal inspection and muster. Brough maintained 
that the whole quota system needed simplification: "It is necessary 
to bring it nearer to the people, where they can know its workings 
and hold some responsibility for it." Warning Schenck that "we are 
drifting upon the breakers," he asserted that a continuation of the 
present system threatened the whole Union war effort. Three days 
later, he again wrote the congressman, declaring that "the bounty 
system began with the General Government—that Government must 
assume the initiative in restraining it."87 
Just as Brough succeeded to the problems of recruiting that had 
faced his predecessors, so the new state executive inherited the role 
of "the soldier's friend." In his inaugural he reiterated Tod's recom­
mendation to increase the tax for the aid of soldiers' families and, 
when he got a law to that effect, appealed to the military committees 
to make sure township and county officers distributed the funds fairly. 
Brough also increased the number of military agencies charged with 
watching over Ohio troops and endeavored to provide them with 
better management. In 1864, one such agent in Washington furnished 
almost 600,000 miles of transportation to enlisted men, collected pay 
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and claims for discharged soldiers, supplied relief to 10,000 troops 
who called at his office, visited hospitals in the vicinity, sent representa­
tives to the armies of the Potomac and James, and disbursed over 
$7,000 for the relief of sick and wounded. Brough continually urged 
his agents everywhere to "be vigilant and look well to every interest" 
of Ohioans in the army. The governor himself visited hospitals in 
Baltimore, Cincinnati, Columbus, and Madison, Indiana. When he 
found cause for dissatisfaction with the surgeons in charge of any 
hospital, he went straight to the United States Surgeon General to 
demand rectification of the wrongs.88 
In his efforts to succor Ohio troops, Brough came into conflict with 
the United States Sanitary Commission, which also sought to collect 
funds and disburse services to sick and wounded soldiers. The gov­
ernor recognized that only through the efforts of his own agencies, 
and not through the Sanitary Commission, was a soldier's "attachment 
to his state quickened and increased." Thus Brough, certainly never 
one to avoid a fight, plunged into battle with the Commission. He 
criticized the agency for demanding a monopoly of donations and 
distribution and praised Indiana's system of providing a central society 
at the capital, under the immediate care of the governor, that received 
and distributed all contributions from the various aid societies. Brough 
felt his state agents were more prompt and energetic and provided a 
more economical and equitable distribution of supplies than the Sani­
tary Commission workers. He refused to let the Commission handle 
the state's money and stores, nor would he withdraw his own agents.89 
Although Brough worked hard to satisfy the demands of Ohioans 
serving in the army, he encountered strong opposition toward his pro­
motion policy. His predecessor, Tod, had had similar troubles, and 
his efforts to promote soldiers on the merits of the individual case 
seemed to satisfy no one. Brough therefore decided to follow a strict 
rule of promotion by seniority, except in clear cases of incompetence; 
but this policy also led to bitter complaints from army officers and 
men. The governor's correspondence with protesting officers was often 
harsh, and Brough continually disregarded military etiquette and the 
communicant's dignity in asserting his final authority to make pro­
motions. Though Brough thought he was being fair in following a 
seniority policy, he built up a reservoir of discontent among Ohio 
soldiers and officers that helped to defeat his political ambitions.90 
In 1864, a national election thrust itself into Ohio politics. Early 
in the year, Brough openly committed himself to Lincoln's renomina­
tion and attacked Secretary Chase, who was busy conniving for Lin­
coln's job. Union Republicans in Ohio quickly killed the Chase move­
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ment in their state and sent a delegation headed by Tod and Dennison 
to the Unionist national convention in Baltimore. Dennison served as 
permanent chairman of the gathering, which endorsed Lincoln's re­
nomination. After the decision was made, Ohio Republicans, led by 
Chase, settled down to campaign for the President. Thus the Union 
men were united, while Democrats were confused by a national plat­
form calling war a failure and demanding cessation of hostilities 
and a candidate, General George B. McClellan, who gave no indica­
tion of stopping the war if elected. Brough found the Democratic 
platform full of hypocrisy and inconsistency and branded it a "base 
attempt to deceive the people of this country." He termed McClellan's 
military career a "magnificant failure,' and said the country needed a 
statesman, not a general. The campaign was short and unexciting. 
In October, the Union party carried its state ticket by 54,000 votes, 
and won 17 of 19 Congressional seats. The next month, Lincoln took 
Ohio with a 60,055 majority.91 
For several months after the 1864 elections, Brough faced no political 
problems; however, in the spring of 1865, he, as had Dennison and 
Tod, faced the question of his own renomination. Brough's conten­
tiousness had led him to make more than his share of enemies. Now 
that the war was almost over, Republicans who were tired of nominat­
ing old Democrats wanted one of their own number selected. Ohioans 
serving in the army wanted a military man for a candidate, and of­
ficers still nursed grudges against Brough's promotion policy. Brough 
debated his chances, and, on June 15, told the people of Ohio that 
he would not be an active candidate for re-election. However, he 
added, due to "pressing importunities from nearly every section of the 
State," he would not decline the nomination if he were presented 
with it. The Unionist party, taking the governor at his word, ignored 
him and proceeded to nominate General Jacob D. Cox. Brough then 
turned away from politics to finish his official duties as governor. The 
war had ended and disbanding the army occupied much of his at­
tention.92 
In the midst of his labors, Brough's health began to give way. The 
governor sprained his ankle, and, in leaning his great bulk on a cane, 
bruised his hand; soon he had contracted gangrene in both hand and 
foot. On August 29, 1865, after a protracted and painful illness, 
Ohio's third and last war governor died.93 Brough had been the most 
vigorous, and also the most unpopular, of the three. Although he 
had had neither to grapple with the rush of momentous new questions 
that had faced Dennison, nor to cope with gloomy periods of wartime 
depression like Tod, Brough had still managed to become embroiled 
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in more than his share of disputes. Yet he, like his two predecessors, 
had given his full efforts to serving his state. 
David Tod, the oldest of Ohio's three war governors, died one 
year after Brough. Tod, never noted for adhering to one view for 
any length of time, had changed his mind about the Negro; in 1866, 
he defended Congressional reconstruction measures aimed at protect­
ing the Negro in the South and supported universal suffrage in Ohio. 
William Dennison, the youngest of the three governors, lived the long­
est and died on June 15, 1882. Dennison remained in the cabinet 
after Lincoln's assassination, but soon became involved in the battles 
between President Johnson and Republican radicals in Congress. The 
ex-governor at first sought to reconcile the differences between the 
two factions, but in July, 1866, deciding he favored the radicals' posi­
tion, he resigned his post. Dennison still harbored ambitions for a 
senatorship; and, in 1880, he ran for Allen G. Thurman's seat in the 
upper house, but lost to James A. Garfield.94 
In spite of the fact that not one of the three governors was renom­
inated by his party, each executive had served his constituents with 
energy and ability. Dennison's job had been the hardest; it was he 
who had to consider the question of compromise, alter the state ad­
ministrative system to meet the new demands of war, answer the first 
troop calls, and strive to save the border states for the Union. Den­
nison, himself inexperienced, suffered from the incompetence of the 
War Department, which was slow to take up the responsibility of 
directing the war effort. However, by the time Brough became gov­
ernor, the federal government had assumed many of the duties here­
tofore filled by state executives; Brough protested that he had too 
little control over the raising and organization of troops. 
The gubernatorial careers of all three men indicate that despite 
the terrific strains and stresses of directing a state in time of war, 
the ultimate problem they had to solve was a political one. Even 
during the Civil War, campaigns and elections went on as usual, 
and governors had to be nominated and elected. Thus Dennison, 
Tod, and Brough each sought to satisfy the various factions that com­
posed their party. Dennison had to conciliate radical Republicans 
from the Western Reserve and conservatives from the Ohio River 
counties; and although he might have done that, he could not propitiate 
war Democrats who were co-operating in the growing Unionist move­
ment. Tod and Brough, themselves products of the Unionist party, 
faced the impossible task of trying to satisfy the whole spectrum of 
opinion that composed the new organization. Though each governor 
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was selected because he best answered the political problems of the 
moment, once in office he found it impossible to maintain his avail­
ability. Ohio was indeed fortunate that her war governors, chosen 
primarily for their political qualifications, proved to be able executives 
capable of meeting the demands of four years of civil war. 
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